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GREG BROWDER & LEONARD ORTOLANO*

The Evolution of an International
Water Resources Management Regime
in the Mekong River Basin
ABSTRACT

The Mekong Basin water management regime has existed since
1957, with three distinct periods. The Mekong Committee (19571975) pursued integrated basin development, which was not
achieved due to geopolitical changes after the Vietnam War.
During the Interim Mekong Committee era (1978-1992), the
Mekong countries pursued independent water resourcesdevelopment, creatingconflicts over water allocation.The Mekong River
Commission (1995-present)aims to help member states sharewater
in the post-Cold War era. The institutionalframework of the
Mekong River Commission reflects the historical legacy of the
Mekong regime and must be understoodin this context. Regional
geopolitics, international development assistance, and water
management norms are used to explain the evolution of the
Mekong regime overfour decades.
INTRODUCTION

Water constitutes a significant challenge for regional cooperation.1
Forty percent of the world's population lives in the approximately 214
international river basins that cover almost half of the global land area,
with thirteen of those international basins shared by five or more
countries.2 As the demand for water increases with population and
economic growth, conflicts such as those that exist in the Nile, the Ganges,
the Jordan, and the Tigris-Euphrates river basins will intensify and become

* Greg Browder is a Water Resources Specialist at the World Bank (the views expressed
in this article are those of the authors and should not be read as representing the views of the
World Bank) and Leonard Ortolano is a Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
at Stanford University.
1. The significance of water as an opportunity for cooperation and the importance of
international commissions were highlighted in the "1998 Petersburg Declaration" and the
1998 "Berlin Recommendations." See German Found. for Int'l Dev., Transboundary Water
Management: Experience of International River and Lake Commissions 5-21 (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the German Found. for Int'l Dev.) (available at
<http://www.africanwater.org/berlinrecom.htm>).
2. See ROBIN CLARKE, WATER: THE INTERNATIONAL CR15 91 (1993).
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more common.3 About two-thirds of the international river basins currently
have some form of cooperative arrangements that are being implemented
and monitored by basin commissions.4 The success of these commissions
will be critical in addressing future water issues. International water
management regimes in the context of developing countries are generally
still in their infancy, especially compared with the well-established water
management systems in North America and Europe.'
In Southeast Asia-in the Mekong River Basin-an international
water management regime has existed since 1957 and is currently entering
a new phase.' Although the Mekong regime has had its share of trials and
setbacks over the decades, its structure and turbulent history provide
insights on how to build water management regimes. This article examines
the Mekong regime and shows how changes in water management
practices, regional geopolitics, and international development assistance
have affected the regime. Like any governance system, the Mekong regime
has a constitutional framework that sets out general principles and
procedures, scope of authority, and organizational structure.7 The Mekong
regime has evolved over three distinct periods, each with its own constitutional framework: (i) the Mekong Committee era (1957-1975), (ii) the
Interim Mekong Committee era (1976-1995), and (iii) the Mekong River
Commission era (1995-present).8
The article analyzes the 1995 Mekong Agreement, which was
signed by the governments of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, and
provides the constitutional foundation for the Mekong River Commission
(MRC).9 The Mekong Agreement is a framework agreement that embodies
many of the principles of the United Nations' 1997 "Convention on the Law
of Non-Navigational Uses of International Water Courses."1" The Agreement

3.

See SANDRA POSTEL, PILLAR OF SAND: CAN THE IRRIGATION MIRACLE LAST? 133-63

(1999).
4.

See German Found. for Int'l Dev., supra note 1, at 3.

5. See id. at 8.
6. See GregBrowder, Negotiating an International Regime forWater Allocation in the
Mekong River Basin 10-11 (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
7. See ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES AND COMMON-POOL RESOURCES 46-49

(1993).
8. See Browder, supra note 6, at 10-11.
9. See Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong
River Basin, Apr. 5,1995, Cambodia-Laos-Thailand-Vietnam, art. IV, 34 I.L.M. 864 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 Mekong Agreement] (availableat Browder, supra note 6, at 334, 343).

10. Int'l Law Comm'n, The Lawofthe Non-NavigationalUses ofInternationalWatercourses,
in REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS FORTY-SIXTY
SESSION 195-396 ch. III (United Nations, SupplementNo. 10 (A/49/10), 1994). Although the
Convention had not yet been adopted by the U.N. during the negotiations for the Mekong
Agreement (1993-1995), the basic principles in the draft convention had essentially already
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reinforces the commitment to cooperation by the signatory states and
directs the MRC to formulate subsidiary agreements related to in-stream
flows and procedures for the review of proposed water uses.11 As of 1999,
the MRC was in the early stages of drafting these subsidiary agreements. 2
Before examining the three eras of the Mekong regime and the 1995
Mekong Agreement, an overview of the geography and hydrology of the
Mekong River Basin is presented.
GEOGRAPHY AND HYDROLOGY OF THE MEKONG BASIN
Figure 1 shows the six countries with territory in the Mekong
Basin: China, Myanmar (also known as Burma), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia,
and Vietnam. Table 13 provides general hydrological and socio-economic
information on the Mekong countries. With an annual flow of 475 billion
m3 (385 million acre-feet), the Mekong River ranks as the eighth largest
river in the world. ' For comparison, in terms of annual flow, the Mekong
River is larger than the Columbia River but smaller than the Mississippi
River. 5
The Mekong Basin experiences a tropical monsoon climate that
produces pronounced wet and dry seasons with relatively warm weather
year-round." During the wet months of August and September, peak flows
in the Mekong River can be as high as 50,000 m3/s (1.7 million cfs), while
during the dry months of April and May, the flow into the Mekong Delta
is reduced to around 2,250 m3/s (78,750 cfs)." During the wet season,
torrential rains result in large-scale flooding along the entire reach of the
Mekong River, with extensive over-bank flows in Cambodia and Vietnam. 8
Because of the warm weather, there is no snowpack (except in the extreme
north in China) to help store the precipitation. 9 Every year, floods in the
Mekong Basin kill dozens, sometimes hundreds,
of people and cause
2
extensive damage to crops and structures. 0

been formulated. See id.
11. See 1995 Mekong Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 26.
12. See Mekong River Comm'n, Records of the Fourth Meeting of the Donor
Consultative Group (DCG) 1 (MRC Secretariat Attachment No. 5, Oct. 19, 1999)
(unpublished document, on file with MRC Secretariat) [hereinafter Fourth Meeting Record].
13. See Browder, supra note 6, at 35 tbl.2-2, 93 tbl.3-3.
14. See id. at 35.
15. See WATER IN CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 157-58
tbLB-6 (Peter Gleick ed., 1993).

16. See Browder, supra note 6, at 36-38.
17. See id. at 37, fig.2-1.
18. See id. at 38.
19.
20.

See id. at 36.
See id. at 38.
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Figure 1: Map of the Mekong River Basin
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TABLE 1:1995 DATA ON THE MEKONG BASIN
Pop.
Pop.
Annual
Basin
Country
In Basin
Total
Flow
Area
(million) (million)
input
(

(bin)
China
Myanmar
Laos
Thailand
Cambodia
Vietnam
Total

165,000

76

(21%)

(16%)

24,000

10

(3%)

(2%)

202,000

166

(25%)

(35%)

184,000
(23%)
'155,000
(20%)

80

National
Per
Cpt
US$

1,133

10

500

40

<1

200

5

5

220

57

21

1,840

9

9

200

70

17

200

-

63

(18%)

90
(18%)

65,000

53

(8%)

(11%)

795,000

475

(100%)

(100%)

Floods in the Mekong Basin also have widespread ecological
effects. Flooding creates an extensive network of wetlands in Cambodia
and Vietnam. Water flooding into nutrient rich areas, combined with high
levels of solar energy, helps support an incredibly productive and diverse
aquatic ecosystem.2 1 The MRC estimates that the annual fish harvest in the
Mekong Basin is around one million tons per year, or about 20 kgs (44 Ibs)
of fish per year for every person in the basin.' Freshwater capture fisheries
(as opposed to freshwater aquaculture) constitute a major source of protein
and an important element of food security for the Basin's mainly poor and
rural population.' The heart of the Mekong Basin's aquatic ecosystem is
the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, also know as the Great Lake. During the dry
season, water flows out of the Tonle Sap into the Mekong River and then
discharges into the South China Sea.' In the wet season, however, there is
a reverse flow and water flows from the Mekong River into the Tonle Sap,
increasing its surface area four-fold from 2,500 km2 (965 mi2) during the dry

21.

See id.

22.

See Jorgen G. Jensen, 1,000,000 Tonnes of Fishfrom the Mekong?, MEKONG FISHERIES

NETWORKNEWSL., Aug. 1996, at 1,1.

23. See id. at 12.
24. See Browder, supra note 6, at 36.
25.

See id.
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season to 10,000 km2 (3,860 mi2) during the wet season.' The Tonle Sap has
a storage capacity of around 75 billion m3 (60 million acre-feet) and helps
to regulate discharges into the Mekong Delta by reducing wet season flows
and increasing dry season flows.' As shown in figure 1, the Delta is located
in the southern tip of Vietnam.
During the dry season there is very little rain and, because there
are few water storage reservoirs and little snowpack, drought-like
conditions prevail over most of the Mekong Basin.' Most farmers are
unable to grow rice during the dry season because of the lack of irrigation
water.2 Low flows in the Mekong River also result in the intrusion of
seawater far up into the Mekong Delta."
MEKONG COMMITTEE ERA (1958-1975)
The Mekong water resource management regime was initially
developed in the midst of the Cold War conflict in Southeast Asia. After
World War II and the withdrawal of French colonial forces from Vietnam
in 1954 (the "1st Indochina War"), mainland Southeast Asia was divided
into many camps," In North Vietnam, Ho Clii Minh's communist
government was supported by the Soviet Union and China.32 In South
Vietnam, the government was backed by the United States, which was
determined to thwart further Communist advances in Asia.' Thailand
remained firmly entrenched in the pro-Western, capitalist camp.' Laos was
embroiled in a prolonged, low-intensity civil war, with Vietnamese-backed
communist forces on one side, and pro-U.S. and Thai forces on the other
side.' In Cambodia, King Shihanouk attempted to remain neutral in the

26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 33.
32. See id. at 33-34. Vietnam's relationship with China slowly deteriorated during the
1960s and 1970s, paralleling the tensions in the Soviet-Chinese relationship. See BU! TIN,
FROM CADRE TO EXILE: THE MEMOIRSOFA NORTH VIETNAMESEJOURNALIST44-45,112 (1995).
33. See FRANKLIN P. HUDDLE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, THE MEKONG PROJECT: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS OF REGIONALISM 4-5 (1972);
Browder, supra note 6, at 33-34.
34. See ELLIOT KULICK & DICK WILSON, THAILAND'S TURN: PROFILE OF A NEW DRAGON

163-70 (1992).
35.

See MARTIN STUART-FOX, BUDDHIST KINGDOM, MARXIST STATE: THE MAKING OF

MODERN LAOS 58-64 (1996).
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military conflict between the Soviet-backed North Vietnamese and the
United States, South Vietnam, and Thailand (the "2nd Indochina War").'
In the mid-1950s, the United Nation's Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East (ECAFE) and the United States' Bureau of Reclamation sent
reconnaissance teams into the Mekong Basin to explore water resource
development options. ' At the time, only 15 million people lived in the
Basin, and average per capita income was less than $100.' The reconnaissance missions produced a bold vision: dam the Mekong River and create
a series of large reservoirs along the mainstream to produce hydroelectric
power, reduce flooding, and increase dry season flows for irrigation and
improved navigation." A Tennessee Valley Authority type effort was
envisioned to develop the Mekong Basin's water resources and lift the
region out of poverty.' The United States, and other pro-Western
governments, also hoped that a far-reaching regional development
program in the Mekong Basin would help cement together South Vietnam,
Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos, and impede communist encroachment into
Southeast Asia.41
In 1957, under the auspices of ECAFE, representatives from the
governments of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand endorsed
a statute creating the "Committee for the Coordination of Investigations in
the Lower Mekong Basin" (i.e., the Mekong Committee).' The term "Lower
Mekong Basin" was used because China and Burma were not members of
the Committee.' China was excluded from the group because it was not a
member of the United Nations at the time, and the Burmese government
was not interested in participating." The 1957 Statute represents the first
constitutional document for the Mekong regime.* Article 4 describes the
functions of the Mekong Committee: to promote, coordinate, supervise,

36.

See DAVID CHANDLER, THE TRAGEDY OF CAMBODIAN HISTORY: POLITICS, WAR, AND

REVOLUTION SINCE 1945 122-92 (1991).
37. See Browder, supra note 6, at 38.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See HUDDLE, supra note 33, at 5.
See Browder, supra note 6, at 39.

43. See MEKONG SECRETARIATTHE MEKONG COMMITrEE: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (19571989) 10-11 (1989).

44. See id.
45. See Statute for the Committee for Co-Ordination of Investigations of the Lower
Mekong Basin, Sept. 17,1957, amended Oct. 31,1957, Aug. 2, 1962, Mar. 1972, CambodiaLaos-Thailand-Republic of Vietnam, reprintedin LEGISLATIVETEXTS ANDTREATY PROVISIONS
CONCERNING THE UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN

NAVIGATION 267, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963) [hereinafter 1957 Mekong Statute]

(availableat Browder, supra note 6, at 300).
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and control the planning and investigation of water resources development
projects in the lower Mekong Basin.'
The mandate of the Mekong Committee was limited to planning
water resource development-although it was generally hoped that
someday the Mekong regime would also assume responsibility for the
construction and operation of water projects.' 7 The Mekong Committee
consisted of four pleni-potentiary members, one from each of the four
countries: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos.48Funding for the
Mekong Committee's studies and planning efforts was provided primarily
by governments from Europe, the United States, and Japan (referred to
herein as "donor countries"). 9 The Committee was supported by the
Mekong Secretariat, a body of about 100 people from the Mekong
countries, the United Nations, and donor countries. The head of the
Secretariat was selected by ECAFE and confirmed by the Mekong
Committee."1 The Secretariat was expected to help mobilize the technical
and financial resources to support water resources development. 2
Two main principles were applied during the Mekong Committee
era: (i) "As a result of the projects recommended [by the Mekong Committee], the existing low water discharge of the Mekong would not be reduced
in any way at any site;" s3 and (ii) "The supplies to be diverted for irrigation
purposes would be met by some storage of flow during high stages of the
river."' Although these two guiding principles may seem restrictive for the
up-stream countries, particularly Thailand, they were premised on the
assumption that large reservoirs would be constructed along the Mekong
River.' The large reservoirs would increase the dry season water supply,
creating water for irrigation use, while maintaining (or increasing) the
existing low water discharge in the Mekong River.'M

46.

Id. at art. 4.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See Browder, supra note 6, at 39-40.
See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 16.
See HUDDLE, supra note 33, at 52 tbl.4.
See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 20-21.
See id.
See id.

53. PRACHOOM CHOMCHAI, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE LOWER MEKONG
BASIN 9 (1990). See also MEKONG SECRETARIAT, PREPARATORY ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL
STUDIES (BASINWIDE): INTRODUCTION TOSTUDYON PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR EQUITABLE
ALLOCATION, USE, CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENTOF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES

7 (1993) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES & CRITERIA].
54. CHOMCHAI, supra note 53, at 9.
55. See Browder, supra note 6, at 168.
56. See id.
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Throughout the 1960s, the Mekong Committee was engaged in a
massive program of water resource investigation and planning.' The
international community, spearheaded by the United States, appeared
ready to invest in the Mekong reservoir cascade.' In 1965, President
Johnson, in a speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University in which he
explained why the United States had begun to bomb North Vietnam,
promised $1 billion in development aid for mainland Indochina-focusing
mainly on the Mekong program." In 1966, U Thant, the United Nations
Secretary General, described the Mekong project as one of the most
important actions ever undertaken by the United Nations.'
By 1972, almost U.S. $70 million (1972 dollars) had been spent on
planning and investigation work, and U.S. $150 million had been invested
in infrastructure projects-primarily small reservoirs on tributaries to the
Mekong river in Laos and Thailand. 1 The United States was the largest
contributor, granting almost $40 million to the Mekong regime.' Thailand,
the focus of much of the planning and construction work, spent $62 million
on activities related to the Mekong regime.' In 1970, the Mekong Committee unfurled the "Indicative Basin Plan," which spelled out the construction
for the mainstream reservoir cascade."
The jewel in the crown of the cascade, and the first mainstream
project slated for construction, was the Pa Mong multi-purpose reservoir
project, located 30 kilometers upstream of Vientiane and straddling the
Thai-Lao border.' In 1973, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation finished a sevenyear, $21 million feasibility study of the Pa Mong project, which called for
a $2 billion investment for a 100 billion m3 reservoir and a 4,800 MW
hydropower plant." Pa Mong had the potential to irrigate approximately
1.6 million hectares in the northeast of Thailand, increase dry season flow
in the Mekong by 2,000 m 3/s, and provide extensive flood protection; it
also required the resettlement of at least 250,000 people and threatened to

57. See id. at 4549,56,62 fig.2-3.
58. See id. at 47; HUDDLE, supra note 33, at 3-5.
59. See Browder, supra note 6, at 47; HUDDLE, supra note 33, at 5.
60. See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supranote 43, at 3.
61. See HUDDLE, supra note 33, at 52 tbl.4.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supranote 43, at 4247; U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, PA MONG PROJECT: AN EXECUIVE SUMMARY OF THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION'S STAGE ONE FEASIBILITY AND PHASE II STUDIES INTO THE VIABILITY OF
ESTABLISHING ADAM, RESERVOIR, AND POWERGENERATING FACILIESON THE MEKONG RIVER

INSOUTHEAST ASIA 1 (1973) [hereinafter PA MONG PROJECT].
65. See Browder, supra note 6, at 50.
66. See PA MONG PROJECT, supra note 64, at 8-9.
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disrupt the Mekong River's sensitive and productive ecology.67 For reasons
explained later, the Pa Mong project was never constructed, but if it had
been built according to the 1972 feasibility study, it would have been one
of the world's largest dam and reservoir projects.'
In preparation for Pa Mong, and other mainstream projects, the
Mekong Committee issued the 1975 Joint Declaration." After intensive
negotiations,7 the Mekong Committee members agreed that all mainstream, major tributary and inter-basin diversions would require the
71
unanimous approval of the Mekong Committee prior to implementation.
Article 17 of the Joint Declaration states,
The Basin State or States, whether territorial or not, which
undertake the project shall present well in advance to the
other Basin States for formal agreement prior to project
implementation a detailed study on all possible detrimental
effects including short and long-term ecological impacts
which can be expected with the territory of other Basin States
as a result of the proposed mainstream project. The procedures and amounts of damages compensation shall be
included in the above study.'
Articles 20 and 21 state that diversions out of the Mekong Basin (inter-basin
diversions) and projects on major tributaries are governed by the same
rules as mainstream projects (i.e., Article 17 above). 3 Article 18 restates the
long-standing Mekong regime principle of maintenance of minimum flows
on the mainstream of the Mekong River during the dry season.7' Article 10
presents the philosophy underlying the 1975 Joint Declaration: "Mainstream waters are a resource of common interest not subject to major
unilateral appropriation by any riparian State without prior approval by
the other Basin States through the [Mekong] Committee."75
Although the Mekong Committee's 1975 Joint Declaration may
seem to undermine the principles of national sovereignty, it was drafted in
the context of the mainstream reservoir cascade, which promised to bring

67.

See Browder, supra note 6, at 50; MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 32-33.

68. See Browder, supranote 6, at 50.
69. See Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilization of the Waters of the Lower
Mekong Basin, Jan. 31, 1975, Cambodia-Laos-Thailand-Republic of Vietnam [hereinafter
1975 Joint Declaration] (availableat Browder, supra note 6, at 308).
70. See generallyLetter from Northcutt Ely, attomey appointed for drafting 1975 Joint
Declaration, United Nations, to Greg Browder, author (Apr. 16,1997) (on file with author).
71. See 1975 Joint Declaration, supra note 69, at art. 1(12).
72. Id. at art XVII.
73. See id. at arts. XX, XXI.
74. See id. at art. XVIII.
75. Id. at art. X.
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substantial benefits to each of the four countries. 6 Moreover, consensus by
the riparian nations would be necessary to obtain the international
financing for mainstream projects."7 It is unclear whether the 1975 Joint
Declaration was a binding international obligation because it was not
submitted for ratification to the member states. It was simply signed by
the four members of the Mekong Committee as a "declaration of intent."'
Nevertheless, the 1975 Joint Declaration represented a milestone in the
evolution of the Mekong regime, and its principles would become the focus
of controversy in the 1990s.
Just as the Mekong regime had assembled all of the elements
needed for a massive regional development effort-investigations
completed, a basin plan, detailed plans for Pa Mong, and the 1975 Joint
Declaration-the geopolitical balance in the region fundamentally shifted.
In a swift and unanticipated succession of events in mid-1975, North
Vietnam achieved military victory over South Vietnam and unified the
country, and Khmer Rouge communist forces gained control of
Cambodia.' In Laos, the Vietnamese-backed communists took control of
the government during 1975 and 1976.81 Only Thailand remained a member
of the pro-Western, capitalist camp.' The dream of integrated development
of the Mekong River was shattered, and the Mekong Committee
collapsed.'
INTERIM MEKONG COMMITTEE (1978-1992)
Although the Thai state remained ideologically opposed to the
communist governments in Vietnam and Laos, and vice versa, diplomatic
relations among the countries were reestablished in 1978." The time was
ripe for a resurrection of the Mekong regime. With assistance from the
United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP) (ECAFE's successor), representatives from Laos, Thailand, and
Vietnam signed the 1978 Interim Mekong Committee (IMC) Declaration.'

76. See Browder, supra note 6, at 52-54.
77. See id. at 54.
78. See id. at 54-55.
79. See id.
80. See TIN, supra note 32, at 197-98.
81. See STUART-FoX, supra note 35, at 58-64.
82. See KUuCK & WILSON, supra note 34, at 153-54.
83. See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 49.
84. See Anuraj Manibhandu et al., CulturalCooperation Ushers in New Era, BANGKOK
POST, Aug, 6, 1996.
85. See Declaration Concerning the Interim Mekong Committee for Coordination of
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, Jan. 5,1978, Laos-Thailand-Vietnam [hereinafter
1978 IMC Declaration] (availablein Browder supra note 6, at 324).
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Cambodia, under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, pursued a policy of "selfreliance" and was not inclined to join international organizations such as
the Mekong Committee.6 The term "interim" was used because it was
hoped that Cambodia would someday rejoin the Mekong regime.'
The 1978 Declaration represented a new constitutional framework
for the Mekong regime, one that reflected the new geopolitical realities. The
governments of Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam wanted to continue to receive
the technical and financial assistance made possible by the Mekong
regime.' Plans for the cascade of reservoirs on the Mekong River, however,
were postponed." Moreover, the Thai government did not want the IMC
to control either the planning or the implementation of water resource
projects in the Mekong Basin.9° The 1978 Declaration states, "t]he functions
of the Interim Committee are to promote the development of water
resources of the lower Mekong Basin." 1 (emphasis added).
The promotion functions of the IMC were much more restrictive
than the functions of the Mekong Committee. The 1957 Statute mandated
the Mekong Committee to "promote, coordinate, supervise and control the
planning and investigation of water resource" projects,' 2 and the 1975 Joint
Declaration extended the powers of the Mekong Committee to control the
implementation of inter-basin diversions and projects on the mainstream
and major tributaries. 3 In contrast, the IMC Declaration only calls for the
IMC to "promote" water resource projects-which meant that the IMC's
main role was to obtain assistance from donor countries.
The 1978 IMC Declaration also made provisions for readmitting
Cambodia into the Mekong Regime in paragraph 3: "The present [Interim]
Committee will be succeeded by the Committee for Coordination of
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin [i.e., the Mekong Committee]
once all members of the latter Committee have decided to participate in
that organization."' This paragraph is ambiguous as to whether the
constitutional documents of the Mekong Committee, namely the 1957
Statute and the 1975 Joint Declaration, would still govern the Mekong
regime when Cambodia was ready to rejoin. This ambiguity became

86. See CHANDLER, supranote 36, at 236-73.
87. See Browder, supra note 6, at 59.

88. See id.
89. See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 49.
90. See Interview with Dr. Prathes Sutabutr, Dir. Gen. Thai Dep't of Energy Dev. &
Planning, in Bangkok, Thail. (Apr. 10, 1996).
91. 1978 IMC Declaration, supra note 85, at art. 4.
92. 1957 Mekong Statute, supra note 45, at art. 4.
93. See 1975 Joint Declaration, supra note 69, at arts. XV-XXI, XXVII.
94. See 1978 IMC Declaration, supra note 85, at 14.

95. Id.at 3.
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important in the early 1990s when Cambodia requested readmission to,
and reactivation of, the Mekong Committee.
The newly formed IMC got off to a rough start when the Vietnamese Army invaded Cambodia in late 1978-less than one year after the IMC
had been created.' The Vietnamese invasion was prompted by Khmer
Rouge attacks against Vietnamese villages along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border and the Vietnamese government's revulsion of the genocidal
policies of the Khmer Rouge." Vietnam subsequently installed a proVietnamese govermnentin Cambodia and maintained troops in Cambodia
to counter an insurgency whose various factions were supported by China,
Thailand, and the United States." The Vietnamese presence and the civil
war in Cambodia lasted until 1990, and strained relations between
Thailand and Vietnam. 11"The relationship between Thailand and Laos,
Vietnam's steadfast ally, deteriorated throughout the 1980s, with frequent
border skirmishes between Thai and Lao troops. 1 The larger ideological
and military struggle in the region was transferred to the IMC, and
meetings between delegations from Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos were
often acrimonious and non-productive."
In spite of these difficulties, the Mekong regime survived thanks
to the neutral sponsorship of the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and donor assistance.'0 3 European donors, especially the Nordic
countries, became the main benefactors of the Mekong regime. The United
States ceased all assistance to the Mekong regime following the end of the
Vietnam War in 1975-a policy that remained in effect as of 1999.04 The
IMC postponed work on mainstream projects, and instead concentrated on
data collection, training, and projects within a single country'05 The IMC
limped along on a much reduced budget, averaging only around $5 to $8
million per year, as opposed to averages of around $20 million during the
Mekong Committee era."04
Although the IMC was slowly slipping into irrelevance, water
resource development within the Vietnamese and Thai portions of the

96.
97.

See Browder, supra note 6, at 101-02.
See id. at 60; TIN, supra note 32, at 198.

98. See TIN, supra note 32, at 116-18.
99. See KUuCK & WILSON, supra note 34, at 154-55.
100. See id.
101.

See id. at 153.

102. See Interview with Dr. Prathes Sutabutr, supra note 90.
103. See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 51, 72.
104. See PACHOOM CHOMCHAI, THE UNITED STATES, THE MEKONG COMMITTEE AND
THAILAND: A STUDY OF AMERICAN MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO NORTHEAST THAILAND SINCE THE 1950S 140 (Asian Studies Monograph No. 051,1994).
105. See MEKONG SECRETARIAT, supra note 43, at 52.
106. See Browder, supra note 6, at 62.
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Mekong Basin was gaining momentum during the 1980s. Vietnamese and
Thai water agencies were pursuing their own (and sometimes potentially
contradictory) water resource development plans. 17 Moreover, China, the
sleeping giant in the upper Mekong Basin, was beginning to awaken, and
the Chinese had their own plans for the Mekong River.108
By 1990, Thai water agencies had constructed at least seven
medium-sized reservoirs within the Mekong Basin in the northeast of
Thailand.'"7 These reservoirs have limited storage capacity, and water
shortages in the arid northeast are a perennial problem."' Moreover, the 20
million residents of the northeast are among the poorest in Thailand."' In
the late 1980s, the Thai government launched an ambitious plan to
accelerate the development of the northeast, based primarily on reforestation and water resource development.1 2 At the heart of the plan lies the
proposed Khong-Chi-Mun project to divert water from the Mekong River
near Vientiane into the Chi and Mun rivers, which then join and flow into
the Mekong River at a point approximately 500 kms downstream from
Vientiane." 3 In the early 1990s, Thai authorities expected to start diverting
approximately 90 m3/s from the Mekong River around the year 2005, with
the prospect of gradually increasing diversions to around 300 m3 /s in later
phases.11 4 For the first phase development, the Khong-Chi-Mun project is
expected to provide irrigation water for half-a-million hectares."
Vietnamese water officials were alarmed by the Thai plans because
dry season diversions from the Mekong River could potentially harm
Vietnamese agriculture in the Mekong Delta.' Around 17 million
Vietnamese live in the Mekong Delta and the Delta is Vietnam's "rice
bowl," accounting for half of its total rice production. 17 In the 1980s, the
Vietnamese government liberalized its agricultural sector, and farmers in
the Delta quickly took advantage of the new incentives by dramatically

107. See id. at 76-81.
108. See id. at 86-91.
109. See id. at 51.
110. See CHOMCHAI, supra note 104, at 86-87.
111. See id. at89-91,93-94.
112. See Browder, supra note 6, at 78.
113. See id.
114. See Tawatchai Tingsanchali & Purushottam Raj Singh, Optimum Water Resources
Allocation for Mekong-Chi-Mun Transbasin IrrigationProject, Northeast Thailand,21 WATER
INT'L 20, 27 tbl.4 (1996).
115. See id. at 22.
116. See Murray Hiebert, Muddy Waters: Conflict Needs Threaten Cooperationover Water
Use, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 21, 1991, at 28,28.
117. Browder, supra note 6, at 76.
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increasing rice production. "8 In a matter of a few years, Vietnam was
propelled from a net importer of rice to one of the world's largest rice
exporters." 9 Increased irrigation accompanied the boom in rice production,
and dry season water shortages have become an even more critical problem
in the Mekong Delta."' Although the dry season flow of the Mekong River
into the Delta is around 2,250 rn 3/ s, at least 1,500 m3/ s is needed to combat
the intrusion of seawater into the Delta.' From early March to May,
seawater from the South China Sea intrudes into the Delta and adversely
affects as many as 1.7 million hectares of agricultural land and creates
domestic water supply problems."n In the early 1990s, Vietnam adopted a
policy of no new dry season abstractions from the Mekong Delta." a This
policy was put in place at the same time the Thais were poised to divert
water from the Mekong River for the Khong-Chi-Mun project.U4
China's activities in the early 1990s added further complexity. At
that time, the Chinese government embarked on a huge hydroelectric
development program that will fundamentally alter the water resource
picture in the entire Mekong Basin.1 5 As shown in table 2, the Chinese have
identified fifteen potential hydropower projects on the Mekong River in
Yunnan province." The three hydropower projects completed or
scheduled for near-term completion: Manwan--completed 1993,'27
Dachaoshan-under construction," and Jinghong-planned with possible
power export to Thailand,1" will have about three billion m3 of active

118. See NEDECO, MASTER PLAN FOR THE MEKONG DELTA IN VIET NAM, SUMMARY
REPORT 3 (1993).
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(1997).
127. See E.C. Chapman & He Darning, Downstream Implications of China's Dams on the
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[Vol. 40

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

storage capacity. If the Xiaowan project is constructed, China will have 18
billion m3 of storage on the Mekong River-about twice the existing storage
capacity in the lower Mekong Basin. Because of the low Chinese demand
for irrigation water from the Mekong, and the unlikely prospects for large
inter-basin diversions in China, Chinese authorities estimate that these four
reservoirs will increase the dry season flow into the lower portion of the
Mekong River by 500 m 3/s, an increase of 25 percent as measured at the
Lao-Cambodian border. 3' If the Nuozhadu dam is built, the dry season
flow will increase by another 500 m 3 /s.132
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF PLANNED CHINESE
RESERVOIRS
Installed
Active
Capacity
Storage
#
Name

(MCM)

_MW

I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
Ip

Manwan
Dachaoshan
Jinghong"
Xiaowan"
Nuozhadu
Huangdeng
Tiemenran
Tuoba
Sijiacun
Wunanglong
Gonguoqiao
Mengsong
Tiabi
Ganlanba
Total

do *Yvtina

w waawo

1,500
1,250
1,350
3,600
4,500
1,860
1,780
1,640
1,100
800
750
600
430
150
21,860

920
960
1,040
14,550
22,700
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
40,170

-vdrnnnwfr Prniet

** To be completed by 2010
n/a = information not available

At the time the Chinese plans for reservoirs on the mainstream of
the Mekong River were proceeding with full steam, the concept of a
cascade of large mainstream reservoirs in the lower Mekong Basin no

130. See Browder, supra note 6, at 74 tbl.3-1.
131. See Darning, supra note 125, at 15-17.
132. See id. at 17.
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longer appeared tenable."a By the early 1990s, democracy was taking root
in Thailand and large-scale resettlement for the Pa Mong project would not
have passed the test of public opinion." Moreover, the Lao government
planned to develop hydropower projects on Lao tributaries to the
Mekong.1" The concept was to develop hydropower through consortiums
with international developers and export the power to Thailand. 3 6 The
former Mekong Committee plan to build joint Thai-Lao projects on the
Mekong River fell into disfavor in Laos when the Lao government realized
that it could avoid international complications and develop its own
hydropower projects." z
Without the prospect of large mainstream reservoirs in the lower
Mekong Basin, and in the face of growing water demands in Thailand and
Vietnam, it became apparent that water allocationwould soon be the central
water resource issue in the lower Mekong Basin.1 8The Chinese reservoirs
would help increase the dry season water supply, but those increases
would not meet the ultimate long-term demand for dry season water.'
Moreover, it remains unclear to what extent China will actually implement
its full hydropower development program in the upper Mekong River.'3
In addition to these water resource developments, in the early
1990s the geopolitics of the region once again underwent a fundamental
shift. The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities for reconciliation
between Thailand and Vietnam.141 In 1991, the United Nations helped
broker the Cambodian Peace Agreement, effectively ending a proxy war
between Vietnam and Thailand in the context of a Cambodian civil war
that had raged for over a decade." A newly-formed coalition government
in Cambodia immediately requested readmission to, and reactivation of,
the former Mekong Committee." The Cambodians were particularly eager

133. See Murray Hiebert, The Common Stream, FARE. EcON. REv., Feb. 21,1991, at 24, 2526 [hereinafter Common Stream).
134. See id. at 25.
135. See id.
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EcoN. REv., Oct. 13,1994, at 70,70-71.
137. See Common Stream, supra note 133, at 25-26.
138. See Hiebert, supra note 116, at 28.
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m3/s, while evenwith the full implementationof theChinese hydropowerprogram the dry
season water supply will only be around 3,000 m/s. See Daming, supra note 125, at 16-17.
140. See Chapman & Darning, supra note 127, at 16.
141. See KULICK &WILSON, supra note 34, at 155-61.
142. See id. at 155.
143. See Murray Hiebert, Cambodia Seeks Foreign Aid for Irrigation Projects: Fertile
Imagination, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 21, 1991, at 26, 27.
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to rebuild their war-torn economy by tapping into the development aid
from donors offered through the Mekong regime.1"
Although both the Thai and Vietnamese governments were eager
to readmit Cambodia, they disagreed on a new constitutional structure for
the Mekong regime."4 The Vietnamese government wanted to return to the
constitutional rules of the former Mekong Committee, whereby all
proposed projects needed to be reviewed and approved by the
Committee. 14 During the IMC era, the Thai government declined to
formally submit the Khong-Chi-Mun project to the IMC, arguing that the
IMC was only mandated to "promote" projects, and not "control and
supervise" projects.1 7 The Thai government was adamant about not
returning to the Mekong Committee's rules, whereby one country could
effectively veto another country's water projects. 1" Thai authorities also
wanted to incorporate China into the Mekong regime because Chinese
developments in the upper-basin would have the most impact on Thailand
(and Laos). 9
In 1992, the Mekong regime almost collapsed due to haggling
between Thailand and Vietnam over the structure of a new Mekong
regime. soA compromise plan was agreed upon in late 1992, whereby the
four lower basin countries, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, would
first negotiate a new framework of cooperation for the Mekong regime.'
They would invite the two upper basin states, China and Myanmar, to join
at a later date. 52 UNDP agreed to help mediate the negotiations, and
UNDP's assistance proved indispensable during the acrimonious and
complex talks that lasted over two years."s The following observations by
senior government officials from Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos illustrate
some of the major concerns:
Vietnam:

Water is important for all four countries for economic and
social development. A framework of cooperation for the

144. See id. at 26-27.
145. See Paul Handley &Murray Hiebert, HostileUndercurrents:DisputeDeepens over Use
of Mekong River Water, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 2, 1992, at 16, 16.
146. See id.
147. See Browder, supra note 6, at 101, 103.
148. See Handley & Hiebert, supranote 145, at 16.
149. See Browder, supra note 6, at 90-91.
150. See Kulachada Chaipipat, Strong Distrust Delays Cooperation on Mekong, NATION
NEWSPAPER (BANGKOK), Mar. 27,1992.
151. See Browder, supra note 6, at 114.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 208-17.
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Mekong would allow for the development of resources and
an international organization for consultation and the
protection of riparian rights. It would allow the countries to
share the water equitably, with trust and confidence. 154
Thailand:
Water allocation became a more critical question in the early
1990s. However, in our view it was the more symbolic issue
of mainstream abstractions than the actual potential impact
that caused the problems between Thailand and the other
Mekong states. This was because the amount of water
withdrawn, especially during the wet season, is insignificant
in comparison to the actual flows. But this issue became too
politicized. In terms of water balances, it is China's activities
that may affect the water balance more than any other single
activity, especially dry season flows. 10
Laos:
Thailand is developing quickly and has already formulated
specific projects for the utilization of Mekong water, especially the Khong-Chi-Mun project. Laos is especially worried
about dry season abstractions. Thailand could potentially
cause ecological problems as well as hurt existing downstream uses-particularly navigation, which is important for
Laos--and quickly appropriate any excess dry season
water .... Laos wants an orderly way to monitor and allocate
water in the basin. In particular, Laos wants to ensure that
there are criteria
for sharing the water and a forum for
15
consultation. 6
As these observations indicate, a key objective for all of the parties
(including Cambodia) was to create a functional system for sharing water,
an issue that is inherently difficult because no universally accepted criteria
exist for sharing water. 7 Upstream states, such as Thailand, generally have
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less incentive to reach water-sharing agreements than downstream states.
Nevertheless, the Mekong states had additional incentives for keeping the
Mekong regime intact. Cambodia and Laos, the two poorest and least
developed members of the Mekong regime, wanted to have continued
access to the international assistance offered through the regime.'" Donor
organizations from Europe and Japan, as well as international organizations such as UNDP, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank,
stood poised to increase their contributions to the Mekong regime if the
member states could reach an acceptable compromise.' The Thai and
Vietnamese governments were intent on developing a more cordial and
supportive relationship after decades of Cold War and ideological
hostility.1" As explained in 1992 by Wichian Watankun, the Thai Deputy
Foreign Minister, "a breakaway [i.e., collapse of the Mekong regime] would
be an undesirable outcome for everyone, including Vietnam, and that
Thailand does not want to see it happen. 'It is against the [current] spirit of
regional cooperation.'" "
The three primary dimensions of the Mekong regime-water
management, regional geopolitics, and international development
assistance--converged in the early 1990s in ways that created the need for
a new constitutional framework. In 1995, the governments of Cambodia,
Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam signed the "Agreement on the Cooperation
for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin.""a The 1995
Mekong Agreement established a new organization, the Mekong River
Commission (MRC), and ushered in the third era of the Mekong regime. 1
MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION ERA (1995-PRESENT)
The 1995 Mekong Agreement serves as the constitutional framework for the MRC and builds upon many of the earlier Mekong Committee
principles. After introducing the main features of the 1995 Mekong
Agreement, an overview of the activities of the MRC up to 1999 is
presented.

COOPERATION AND MANAGING CONFLICT 17, 20-22 (Salman M.A. Salman & Laurence

Boisson de Chazournes eds., World Bank Technical Paper No. 414,1998).
158. See Browder, supra note 6, at 203-04.
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Article 6: Maintenance of Flows on the Mainstream

The negotiators for the Mekong Agreement faced a dilemma: in an
era of growing water scarcity they needed to fashion a new framework for
the Mekong regime that protected the interests of all parties. In the mid1990s, a number of important beneficial uses of Mekong water had been
established. Among other concerns, the Vietnamese wanted to at least
maintain the existing dry season flows into the Mekong Delta so they
would be able to sustain rice harvests and combat salinity intrusion.1' The
Lao were intent on preserving the dry season navigability of the Mekong
River, which serves as Laos' main transportation artery.1 " Finally, the
Cambodians wanted to protect the hydrological and ecological integrity of
the Tonle Sap (i.e., the Great Lake) by ensuring sufficient reverse wet
season flows from the Mekong River into the Tonle Sap.1"
Since 1957, the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin have tried to
ensure that "the existing low water discharge of the Mekong would not be
reduced in any way at any site.""6 The Mekong Agreement preserves this
principle in Provision A of Article 6, which requires the parties to maintain
the natural dry season flow in the Mekong River." The natural flow is that
which occurs in the absence of water storage reservoirs.69 Since the entire
man-made storage capacity in the Mekong Basin in 1995 was only around
two percent of the annual flow, the actual dry season flow in the Mekong
River in the mid-1990s was approximately equal to the natural flow.'"
Provision A of Article 6 thus protects important existing beneficial water
uses in Vietnam (irrigation and salinity repulsion) and Laos (navigation).
Moreover, maintaining existing in-stream flows during the dry season will
help safeguard the aquatic ecosystem.
Provision B of Article 6 calls for maintaining wet season flows in
the Mekong River sufficient "[tfo enable the acceptable reverse flow of the
Tonle Sap to take place during the wet season.... "17 This protects Cambodia's existing use of wet season water to sustain the hydrological and
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ecological integrity of the Tonle Sap. During the wet season, at the junction
of the Mekong River and the Tonle Sap River (which feeds the Tonle Sap
Lake), a portion of the flow of the Mekong River flows into the Tonle Sap
River, and the remainder flows into the Mekong Delta and out into the
South China Sea.1" In order to preserve reverse wet season flows into the
Tonle Sap, large wet season flows will have to be maintained in the
Mekong River."n High wet season flows in the Mekong River will help
sustain ecologically important wetlands both downstream and upstream
of the junction of the Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers."
The Mekong Agreement does not specify the locations, nor the
numerical values, for dry and wet season Mekong River flows, but rather
delegates this responsibility to the MRC. In principle, Article 6 represents
a de facto allocation of water according to existing beneficial uses. 7 6 In
practice, the details still need to be formulated by the MRC and incorporated into a subsidiary agreement.'"
Article 5: Reasonable and Equitable Utilization
The governments from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam
accepted the general doctrine of "reasonable and equitable utilization" of
international waters.1" The challenge was to devise a water allocation
system that supported this doctrine, while not unduly constraining
national sovereignty.'" The negotiators did not want to make specific water
allocations because future dry season flows (in excess of the existing flows)
depend on the development of water storage reservoirs, especially in
China.1" The Mekong Agreement thus focuses on procedures and
principles for the review of proposed water uses. During the Mekong
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Committee era, all proposed water uses had to be unanimously approved
by the Mekong Committee.'$' In contrast, there were no review requirements in the Interim Mekong Committee era.1" Article 5 of the Mekong
Agreement represents a balance between the strict requirements of the
Mekong Committee and the absence of reviews in the IMC era.1"

The Thai government, as a relative up-stream state, wanted to
avoid a system for project review within the MRC that could potentially
obstruct their water resource development plans. 8' Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Lao negotiators wanted to return to the rules of the Mekong
Committee, whereby all proposed projects had to be reviewed and
approved by the Mekong regime members prior to implementation.' s Thai
negotiators favored a more flexible set of rules that did not require
agreement within the MRC for all proposed projects.1 ' After extensive
bargaining, the negotiators reached a compromise solution on Article 5,
which is summarized as follows:
1. Notification in all Seasons on the Tributaries;
2. On the mainstream of the Mekong River: during the Wet
Season, notification for intra-basin use, and consultation that
aims at agreement for diversions outside of the Mekong Basin;
during the Dry Season, consultation that aims at agreement for
intra-basin use, and prior consultation and agreement for
diversions outside of the Mekong Basin."
Thus, Article 5 contains a complex set of general procedures. The
Mekong Agreement does not specify the time frames for the wet and dry
season, nor does it discuss the requirements for notification, prior
consultation, or agreement." Rather, the Mekong Agreement requires the
MRC to work out the procedural details for the review of proposed water
uses in a subsidiary agreement(s).' Article 5 was the most contentious
issue during the negotiations and its complexity and ambiguity foreshadow the difficulties the Mekong regime may confront in dealing with
water allocation issues. 19°
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The Thais saw Articles 5 and 6 as being intimately linked.19' The
Thai negotiators were interested in maintaining their options on the
ambitious Khong-Chi-Mun project (the diversion from the Mekong River
into the Northeast of Thailand), as well as preserving the right to divert
water out of the Mekong Basin into other water-short basins within
Thailand."2 Shortly after the Mekong Agreement was signed, Thai water
officials unveiled a plan to divert two billion in3 (1.6 MAF) of water from
the Kok and Ing Rivers, which are Thai tributaries to the Mekong River,
into the Chao Phraya Basin, where Bangkok is located.' 3 Thai negotiators
agreed to Article 6 of the Mekong Agreement-which essentially safeguards existing (mid-1990) uses of water-because they realized that they
could probably divert part of the surplus dry season flows to be generated
by the Chinese reservoirs without harming other Mekong states."' Prathes
Sutabutr, a leading Thai official in the Mekong regime at the time, reported
in a Thai newspaper:
The Chinese dams will be very beneficial for the lower
[Mekong] basin. These man-made storage reservoirs will give
noticeably more water in the dry season and keep natural
floods from occurring in the wet season.... When construction
of Xiaowan Dam is completed, it will increase low flow to the
Mekong at about 35 percent or about 555 cubic metres per
second. The [planned] 15 projects will eventually increase the
low flow by about 1,230 cms .... China's dams are significant... .We also have a plan to divert the extra water, released
from China's dams, from the Mekong mainstream into
Thailand. 195
Article 2: Projects, Programs, and Planning
Article 2 of the 1995 Mekong Agreement requires the signatories
to "promote, support, cooperate and coordinate" water resource development.'4 The Mekong Agreement is less restrictive than the 1957 Statute
which calls for the Mekong Committee to "promote, coordinate, supervise

191. See Interview withKrit Kraichitti, Dir. Treaty Div. ThaiMinistry of Foreign Affairs,
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Summner 2000]

THE MEKONG RIVER BASIN

and control" water resource development." The Mekong Agreement thus
goes beyond the IMC's mandate to simply "promote" water resource
development.'" Coordination-rather than the control-of water resources
development now appears to be the primary function of the Mekong
regime.
Article 2 also calls for the MRC to formulate a "basin development
plan" (BDP).1" The Mekong regime had previously crafted two basin
development plans, one in 1970 by the Mekong Committee and another in
1987 by the IMC.3 These plans focused primarily on the long-term vision
of creating a cascade of large reservoirs on the Mekong River. 1 Since the
prospects for the mainstream cascade have faded, the MRC's basin
development plan will probably focus on helping to coordinate water
resource developments so as to avoid or minimize future water conflicts
and help maintain the aquatic ecology of the Mekong Basin.1
The Mekong Agreement does not specify the BDP as a binding
plan for the MRC-member states. Rather, the BDP is a tool for coordinating
water resource development and management from a basin-wide
perspective. The BDP could also potentially help expedite international
financing of water projects by identifying high priority projects that have
been analyzed within a basin context. Formulation of the BDP will not be
a straightforward task. Like any water resource planning exercise, there are
bound to be multiple-and sometimes conflicting-objectives that need to
be reconciled. For example, the BDP must address the issue of water
sharing between the Mekong states and formulate a strategy for balancing
economic development goals with social equity and ecological concerns.'
Articles 21-33: Organizational Arrangements
During the Mekong Committee and IMC eras there were two
permanent bodies: the [Interim] Mekong Committee and the Secretariat?"
The Mekong Committee was the decision-making body of the Mekong
regime, responsible for "technical matters" within the competence of the
Committee.' The Mekong Committee members, however, may not have
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not policy matters).
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been authorized to make policy decisions on behalf of their governments. "
In contrast, the Mekong Agreement gives the MRC explicit authority to
make binding policy decisions.'
The MRC is a single organization with three bodies: the Council,
the Joint Committee, and the Secretariat.' The Council, which meets at
least once a year, is the policy-making body of the MRC and is composed
of one representative at the ministerial level from each MRC member
government.' The Joint Committee, which meets at least three times per
year, is the operational decision-making body of the MRC and consists of
one official at the department head level from each MRC member
government.' The primary functions of the Secretariat are to procure
international assistance, administer projects, and undertake selected
technical tasks such as maintaining a hydrological database."
Article 15 of the Mekong Agreement specifically authorizes the
MRC Council to make policy decisions on behalf of member
governments. This was partly in response to the question of whether the
former Mekong Committee had acted within its authority in issuing the
1975 Joint Declaration." Moreover, because the MRC will most likely
confront a number of sensitive policy issues-particularly with respect to
water allocation-the framers of the Mekong Agreement wanted to ensure
that the MRC would have the authority to make policy decisions. 1'
The Mekong Agreement also changed the role of the Secretariat by
making it more accountable to the MRC Council and Joint Committee.1
During the Mekong Committee and IMC eras, the Secretariat was headed

206. See CHOMCHAI, supra note 53, at 10.
207. See 1995 Mekong Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 15.
208. See id. at art. 12.
209. See id. at art. 15.
210. See id. at arts. 21-24.
211. See id. at arts. 28-30. The Secretariat has a staff of approximately 100 people,
composed of two groups, riparian staff and external staff. See Browder, supra note 6, at 229.
Riparian staff members are drawn from national government agencies in Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam. See id. at 231. External staff comes from countries outside of the
Mekong region and is usually funded by the respective governments or an international
organization such as UNDP. See id. at 231. Most of the Secretariat's projects are actually
implemented by international consultants working in conjunction with government
agencies in the Mekong region. See id. International donor agencies, such as bilateral donor
agencies or international organizations, fund essentially all of the Mekong regime's
projects. See MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION, 1 MRC WORK PROGRAMME 2000: ACrvTIES AND

RESOURCES REQUIRED 6,11-14 (1999) [hereinafter I MRC WORK PROGRAMME 2000].
212. 1995 Mekong Agreement, supra note 9, at art. 15.
213. See PRINCIPLES & CRrrERIA, supra note 53, at 25.
214. See id.
215. See Interview with Roy Morey, Vietnam Country Resident Representative, UNDP,
in Hanoi, Vietnam (May 11, 1996).
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by an "Executive Agent," who was typically a UNDP career employee. 216
The Executive Agent exercised considerable influence on the Mekong
regime and was, in many ways, the leader of the Mekong regime.21 7 The
Mekong Agreement replaced the post of Executive Agent with the position
of "Chief Executive Officer" (CEO), who is charged with managing the
Secretariat and reporting directly to the Joint Committee."8 The CEO is no
longer expected to provide the same level of leadership in the MRC; instead
the burden of leadership has fallen on the Joint Committee-acting under
the general policy guidance of the Council. 9 The CEO is no longer a
UNDP employee, nor is he nominated by UNDP; rather, the MRC Council
selects its own CEO.'
Some of the negotiators for the Mekong Agreement felt the
influence that had been wielded by the Secretariat during the Mekong
Committee and IMC eras was no longer appropriate. 1 During the Mekong
Committee era, the goal had been to mobilize international finance and
technical support for the Mekong reservoir cascade.' Under these
circumstances, it was useful to have a strong Executive Agent helping to
mediate between Mekong Committee members and procuring international support.' In the MRC era, with sensitive water allocation issues on
the agenda, the presence of a strong Secretariat brokering solutions did not
appeal to all of the member countries, particularly Thailand.' In fact,
during one acrimonious period in 1993, when Thailand and Vietnam were
at odds on how to restructure the Mekong regime, the Thai government
unilaterally dismissed the Executive Agent on the grounds that he had lost
his neutrality.
UPPER BASIN STATES: CHINA AND MYANMAR
In the early 1990s, when the scale of the Chinese hydropower
development plans became evident, Thai authorities wanted China to
participate in the Mekong regime.' The Vietnamese negotiators preferred

216. See Somporn Sangchai, The Mekong Committee: A New Genus of International
Organization 93-94 (1967) (Ph.D dissertation, Indiana University).
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to first negotiate the Mekong Agreement, and then invite the Chinese and
Burmese governments to join the Mekong regime.' The Thais reluctantly
agreed to the Vietnamese proposal, and after the establishment of the MRC,
one of its highest
priorities was to solicit the involvement of China and
m
Myanmar.
After a number of exploratory meetings, China and Myanmar
became official dialogue partners with the MRC in late 1996. 1 As dialogue
partners, representatives from China and Myanmar have the right to attend
Joint Committee and Council meetings and voice their governments'
opinions.' In addition, the establishment of two working groups with
members from the MRC, China, and Myanmar was authorized in mid1996; one group concerned hydrology and the other focused on
navigation."3 ' The Chinese government is particularly interested in using
the Mekong River as a navigation route into Southeast Asia and exporting
hydropower to the region.' Neither the Chinese nor Myanmar governments, however, appear enthusiastic about moving beyond the dialogue
process and signing the Mekong Agreement, thereby becoming full-fledged
MRC members.'
Three factors indicate that China is unlikely to sign the Mekong
Agreement. First, the Chinese government would probably be reluctant to
jeopardize its ambitious hydropower development program on the upper
Mekong River by subjecting itself to the MRC rules on water utilization.'4
Second, China was only one of three governments to vote against the 1997
United Nations Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Water Courses.' Since the Chinese government voted against the
Convention, it is doubtful that they would sign the more comprehensive

227. See id.
228. See Interview with Krit Kraichitti, supra note 191.
229. See Don Pathan, Burma Wins MRC Entry with China, NATION NEWSPAPER
(BANGKOK), Nov. 1, 1996.
230. See id.
231. See Browder, supra note 6, at 232.
232. See Kulachada ChaipipatMekongRiver Pactto Be Signed Today, NATION NEWSPAPER
(BANGKOK), Apr. 20,2000.
233. See Academic: China Will Not Join Mekong Body, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 24, 1996.
234. See id.
235. See United Nations: Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, 36 I.L.M. 700, 700 (1997) ("On May 21, 1997, by Resolution
51/229, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Law of Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses, by a vote of 103 in favor to 3 against
(Burundi, China, Turkey), with 27 abstentions...").
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Mekong Agreement. I Third, the Chinese government can probably
achieve many of its objectives, such as improving navigation on the
Mekong River, through the dialogue process-without having to legally
bind China to the Mekong Agreement requirements.'
FORMULATING SUBSIDIARY AGREEMENTS AND THE BDP
Immediately after its establishment in 1995, the MRC identified its
two highest priorities as (i) drafting the basin development plan, and (ii)
formulating subsidiary agreements on the Rules for Water Utilization
(incorporating both Articles 5 and 6 ).' As of early 1999, the MRC has
made some progress on both endeavors.
Formulating the BDP has turned out to be an enormous task. This
is partly due to the practical difficulties of conducting water resource
planning on such a vast scale: the lower Mekong Basin covers 600,000 km2
(slightly larger than France), has 52 million inhabitants, and includes four
sovereign states.'"Moreover, the BDP must confront potentially contentious issues such as water allocation and ecological constraints.' Finally,
because the MRC relies on international donors to fund its projects, it must
find donors willing to undertake a long-term and major commitment to
support the basin development plan."' The MRC has actively solicited
donor assistance for the BDP since 1995, and to-date has not received a fullscale commitment to finance the BDP.3 MRC officials are hopeful that BDP
funding will be provided by the Nordic countries by 2001 .2
In late 1995, the MRC drafted a proposal for donor funding on a
project to formulate "rules for water utilization."2 " Thai and Vietnamese
representatives to the MRC quickly became embroiled in a dispute over
whether these rules should include water quality, and progress on
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implementing Articles 5 and 6 was stalled between 1996 and 1997.2 In
1998, the MRC received a grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF)
to prepare a program to negotiate and implement water utilization
rules-known as the Water Utilization Program (WUP).21 In October 1999,
the MRC Council endorsed the WUP and committed its member governments to make a good faith effort to negotiate a complete set of rules for
water utilization by 2005.47 In early 2000, the MRC received an $11 million
GEF grant through the World Bank to start WUP.2" The GEF grant finances
the development of a basin-wide simulation model and a structured
negotiation process to formulate the rules for water utilization. 9
The slow progress on drafting key subsidiary agreements to the
Mekong Agreement does not mean that the MRC has been unproductive.
Table 3 presents a summary of the MRC's funded projects as of 1999. '
The MRC has a project portfolio of around U.S. $45 million, containing a
wide variety of projects.5 1 European donors account for around two-thirds
of the MRC's budget, and most of the European-supported projects deal
with environmental and natural resource issues.' In particular, the MRC
has launched one of the world's most impressive fishery research and
management programs5 3
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF KEY MRC ACTIVITIES IN 2000
Activity

Water Utilization Program
Flood Control Planning in
Lower Mekong Basin
Natural Resources

Amount

(U.S. $
Million)
13.8
0.9

Donors

GEF, Finland, France, Japan
Korea

4.3

Germany

Fisheries
Watershed Classification
Environment Program

12.3
0.8
3.3

Denmark
Switzerland
Denmark, Sweden,

Hydrology Program
Agricultural Land

3.1
1.1

Switzerland, UK, UNEP
Australia, Japan
Japan

6.0

UNDP, Switzerland, New

Management/Lower Basin

Resources Inventory

Human and Organizational
Development
Total

Zealand, Japan, Denmark,
Switzerland
45

In spite of the high levels of international funding for the MRC and
its many innovative and important projects, the MRC has still not come to
terms with one of its major water management issues: the allocation of dry
season flows. The 1995 Mekong Agreement provides a framework for
addressing water-sharing issues, but the concrete water allocation
decisions will have to be made within the MRC.' As suggested at the
beginning of this article, water allocation-especially at the international
level-is an inherently difficult issue and the MRC faces many challenges.
SUMMARY
Table 4, which summarizes the Mekong regime over the past four
decades, is organized around three primary dimensions: water management, regional geopolitics, and international assistance. Each era of the
Mekong regime has a constitutional framework tailored to the regional
geopolitics and water management objectives of the period-and each era
was held together by international assistance. As this historical review of
the Mekong regime shows, regional geopolitics has been the primary force
shaping the regime. The Mekong Committee was established in the
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incipient phase of the Vietnam War and collapsed in 1975 at the end of the
conflict. The Interim Mekong Committee arose in the context of the
ideological enmity between Thailand and Vietnam and was constrained by
the civil war in Cambodia. The end of the Cold War, and the winding
down of the Cambodian conflict, ushered in a new era of geopolitics that
paved the way for the MRC.

TABLE 4: HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF MEKONG REGIME
Regim
Water
Regional
International
Era
Management
Geopolitics
Benefactors
Objectives

Mekong
Committee

Integrated
Development

Allies Against
Communism

United States
United Nations

Independent
Development

Cold War
Antagonists

Europe
United Nations

Water
Allocation

Regional
Partners

Europe, Japan
United Nations

(1957-1975)

Interim
Mekong
Committee
1978-1992

MRC
1995- Present

The water management dimension of the Mekong regime has been
shaped by both regional geopolitics and prevailing water resource
development norms. In the 1960s, integrated basin development along the
lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority experience was considered by
many water resource professionals to be ideal. With the strong support of
the United States and its allies, the Mekong Committee vigorously pursued
the integrated development approach until the end of the 2nd Indochina
War. However, the dream of a cascade of reservoirs on the lower Mekong
River evaporated in 1975 in the face of hostility between Thailand and the
two new communist governments in Vietnam and Laos.
The IMC survived, even though it did not prosper, because it
served the useful function of procuring international assistance for water
projects in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. The IMC also carried on the
important work of hydrological monitoring. European governments and
UNDP continued to support the Mekong regime throughout the IMC era,
although at a more modest level than during the Mekong Committee era.
The IMC members abandoned the concept of integrated development and
strove to independently develop their own water resources. By the early
1990s, the limits of independent development became obvious as Thai
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plans to divert water from the Mekong River created tensions with the
other Mekong regime states.
Converging events in the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and
the construction of Chinese reservoirs in the upper basin, set the stage for
the MRC. In the 1990s, the concept of a cascade of mainstream dams in the
lower Mekong Basin-requiring the resettlement of large numbers of
people, entailing severe ecological disruption, and calling for complex
international agreements-no longer seemed sound. Chinese reservoirs in
the upper Mekong Basin could help the Mekong regime to avoid the
contentious task of water reallocation. Future Chinese reservoirs may make
it possible to protect existing (1995) uses of dry season water, while the
MRC works out ways to share surplus flows in the dry season. Constructing a system for coordinating water resource development activities and
allocating dry season water, while protecting the environment and
maintaining friendly relations among member states, constitutes the
primary challenge of the MRC era.

